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Abstract 
 
This study discusses the risk-decisions of peasant economy. It draws examples 
from campesinos in Chile and suggests how these decisions may impact the future 
of campesinos as a distinct cultural group. Utilising a theoretical discussion, 
illustrated with empirical field data, some of the risks as perceived by campesinos 
across a region of Chile’s Central Valley are highlighted. The study first analyses 
how risk-decisions are made, using Lipton’s Theory of the Optimising Peasant as 
a framework, by drawing on risk-decision and aspiration studies from economics 
and psychology. It then assesses the impact that risks and risk-decisions, with 
particular regard to modernisation practices, may have on the future of 
campesinos and whether they will become depeasantisied or remain as a culturally 
unique group. The research finds that aspirations are often defined by social-group 
averages, that this may influence risk-decisions among campesinos, and that 
campesinos are likely to be stability, rather than optimisation seeking. Further, it 
suggests that a linear illustration of campesino cultural survival or loss in the 
market economy can be expanded. A theoretical model is proposed which 
incorporates modernisation decisions to explain the complex relationship between 
perceived risks and decisions which will influence the future trajectory of 
campesinos. 
(Word count: 14,963) 
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Introduction 
There is much debate surrounding the future of peasant agriculture in an increasingly 
globalised world. For many, this is a world of liberalised markets and internationally 
exported goods. In the peasant economy, where auto-consumption
1
 and income-diversity 
often play a key role (Chayanov, 1966; Escobar, 1995; Hayami, 1996; Kay, 1997; 2002;) this 
brings both risks and opportunities. Peasant households must decide their level of interaction 
with the market. The debate of peasant economy revolves heavily around interaction, 
competition and survival in the market, exemplified by Chayanov (1966
2
), Shultz (1964), 
Lipton (1968), Hayami (1996) and in Latin America specifically by Kay (1971; 1997a; 2002) 
and more recently Murray (1997, 2006). 
Chile often serves as an example of the neo-liberal market system of much of Latin America. 
The World Bank describes it as an upper middle income county, though its rural poverty rate 
is still 11%, the burden being disproportionately shared by its campesinos (World Bank, 
2013; Kay, 1997a), the traditional peasant class of Latin America; auto-consuming small-
holders who may have other on or off-farm sources of income generation (Kay 1997a; Bauer 
1971; 1975). Chile’s agriculture accounts for around 7.5% (USD$6bn) of total exports 
(FAOSTAT 2013; World Bank 2013), despite a recent and rapid growth in the mining sector 
which masks some of its value.  
As Chilean agriculture has re-oriented itself towards market-based exports questions abound 
over whether campesinos will compete, withdraw or be overcome by land-purchase, perhaps 
turning to a proletarianised system of predominantly temporary labour (Murray, 1994; 2006; 
Kay, 1997a; Korovkin, 1997). Much of the agricultural land (61%) is owned and operated by 
large-scale farmers, forming 74% of agricultural output employing 64% of the rural labour. 
However, a large minority, 39%, is still owned by campesinos, producing around 26% of 
total output. (Kay, 2002:482-483). Many Chilean campesino households engage in the wider 
market handling market price uncertainties alongside production uncertainties caused by 
Chile’s highly variable climate. Campesinos are important to Chilean agriculture, hence 
understanding their future trajectory is important, too. 
                                                 
1
 The process of growing food for household consumption, being nutritionally self-sufficient 
2
 This reference is to the translation of Chayanov’s 1925 work, The Theory of Peasant Economy 
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Debunking the myth that peasant agriculturalists are irrational and irresponsive to incentive, 
development economist Theodore Shultz published his “Efficient-but-Poor” hypothesis in 
1964. It claimed that peasants maximise their marginal productivity within their means, but 
lack the capital to invest in modernisations to increase production (Shultz 1944; Lipton 1968). 
Lipton (1968) theorised this further; in his work The Theory of the Optimising Peasant he 
claims that peasants are productivity optimisers (rather than maximisers), reducing 
productivity in order to moderate risks and secure a minimum income. Lipton’s theory 
assumes that decision-makers will make rational choices to optimise their production, though 
the decision-making process is complex, owing to a myriad of unknowns and also individual 
aspirations. 
How decisions such as the level of market interaction are made involves a complex decision 
process based largely on economical perceived risks (Friedman and Savage, 1948; Kahneman 
and Tversky, 1979) and socially constructed aspirations (Festinger, 1942; 1954; Quagila and 
Cobb, 1996). Clarke (1980:287) summarises the interaction between these two factors by 
describing risk as “the perceived inability to cope satisfactorily with the world around us”. 
This study investigates Lipton’s theory in the context of campesinos in the Chilean capitalist 
market economy, where there is debate into the future prospects for campesinos. A 
dichotomous theoretical contention is set out by Murray (2006:648) between 
Decampesinistas – those who believe campesinos are being re-converted back in an 
impoverished proletariat by large-scale agricultural capitalism; and Campesinistas – those 
who believe that the demise of campesino culture is not a necessary outcome of capitalist 
production. Murray (2006) places these dichotomies at either end of a linear Peasant 
Economy Continuum. Whether or not campesinos will remain, and how they will do so is 
unclear. This study takes the views that the risk decisions made at the household level will 
have a large impact on the future of campesinos in Chile and hence a deeper understanding of 
the process in context is necessary. 
Objectives of the Research 
This study seeks to enlighten the discussion of the relationship between campesinos and their 
agricultural risk decision – analysing how decisions are made and what aspirations these are 
in pursuit of. This is placed in the context of the market economy of Chile. 
Optimising Stability  2013
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This study first provides background details to clarify the context of the primary data. This is 
accompanied by some guiding concepts which are used throughout the study, though most of 
the theoretical presentation occurs together with the analysis. 
The research draws both on risk-decision and aspiration theories to explore Lipton’s Theory 
of the Optimising Peasant (OP Theory) with examples from primary data. It then considers 
the impact of this decision making process on the debate surrounding the prospects for 
campesinos in capitalist Chile. It draws on examples from primary interview data collected 
through semi-structured interviews in Chile’s Central Valley to illustrate the wider theoretical 
discussion the future of campesinos as a cultural group of independent agricultural producers.  
Subsequently an analysis of The Peasant Economy Continuum, outlined by Murray (2006), is 
conducted. A discussion of the competing campesinista-decampesinista theories will be 
placed in the context of OP Theory and risk-decisions with primary data examples from 
research conducted with Chilean campesinos. 
The purpose of this study is to critically analyse relevant theories of campesino agriculture in 
the context of risk-decision and perceptions of risk. Through this, it is hoped that a better 
understanding of the potential future of campesino agriculture particularly in global markets 
can be forged. As such the following questions are posed: 
 How can The Theory of The Optimising Peasant be applied to the 
comprehension of risk-decisions of campesinos in the Central Valley? 
 How can the discussion of the Peasant Economy Continuum Theory be informed 
by the discussion surrounding The Theory of the Optimising Peasant?  
These research questions are analysed through three constructed hypotheses, which aim to 
provide a framework for interpretation of the theoretical data illustrated by primary empirical 
data from the field. 
Hypothesis 1: Theories of risk decision will apply to the Theory of the Optimising Peasant. 
Hypothesis 2: Evidence from data collected will support the Theory of the Optimising 
Peasant and will highlight areas in which individual campesinos are vulnerable to risk by 
demonstrating that:  
 
Optimising Stability  2013
 
10 
 
a. Campesinos engage in risk averse behaviour due to perceptions of productivity 
and price uncertainties 
b. Aspirations are based in meeting minimum requirements due to the risk of 
reduced standard of living from risky ventures which do not pay off under certain 
circumstances. 
Hypothesis 3: Risk decisions within optimisation strategies are insufficient make 
interpretations for or against the onset of depeasantisation in Chile’s market economy, as 
described by Murray (2006). 
 
Background 
Study Site 
Chile has a population of around 17 million, of this 11% live in rural area with equating to 
around 250,000 campesinos farm units
3
 (Kay, 2002; World Bank 2013). Campesinos are a 
peasant farming class with ties to the land (see below). The data for the study brings 
examples from farmers and campesinos located in the Central Valley, Chile’s agricultural 
heartland. Geographically it has a temperate climate, with seasonal precipitation and a 
growing season which complements the Northern Hemisphere’s off season. Since Chile’s re-
orientation towards exportable produce it has become the leading exporter of off-season fruit 
to Europe and the USA (Echeverría et al. 2009, Murray 2006, FAOSTAT 2013), though it 
also produces its own staple crops such as maize, wheat and potatoes. Of this 25% of all 
Chile’s fruit and vegetables come from the Bío-Bío region (region VIII), where this study 
takes place (Ministry of Agriculture, 2013). The study focusses on three regions surrounding 
the city of Chillán (36
o36’ S, 72o06’ W), which is positioned at the centre of the Central 
Valley. 
Chilean Agriculture 
From Haciendas to the Market  
Up until the 1960s Chile’s agricultural landscape, like many Latin American countries was 
still based on the Hacienda system. This was a semi-feudal land-holding system generating 
                                                 
3
 A unit of measure for the entire household, rather than individuals 
Optimising Stability  2013
 
11 
 
low levels of land and labour productivity Gwynne and Kay (1997:3), Kay (1997a:12, 1997b), 
with land-owners - hacendados - and small-holders – campesinos 4  – who produced on 
sections of the hacienda, typically retaining control over production decisions (Pilotti (1979: 
526). 
Bellisario (2007:7) describes the hacienda system as a major source of political power. The 
subsequent removal of the hacienda system was intended to empower campesinos and give 
them more equal standing in society. However, many argue that the new economic system 
developed throughout the Pinochet era, but still continuing today, has imposed similar levels 
of control and a lack of empowerment (Kay, 1997a, b; Bellisario 2007). 
Much of the reform occurred in the latter half of the 20
th
 Century, under Presidents Frei and 
Allende, beginning in 1964, with the expropriation of over 5,800 estates, covering nearly 
60% of the agricultural landscape. This continued under the military government of Pinochet, 
but with “partial counter-reform” which reallocated around 41% of recently expropriated land 
(over half the agricultural land in Chile) to campesinos and the remainder to competitive 
commercial farms and agribusinesses to boost agricultural exports. (Bellisario, 2007; Kay, 
1971; 1997a, b; Robles-Ortiz 2009) 
The new export market-oriented approach brought export revenues to Chile. However, many 
campesinos saw their new lands divided or confiscated due to supposed “illegal” 
expropriation by the previous government, forcing them to join the labour market (Bellisario, 
2007:20-25). Today, much of the most productive land is owned by large-scale farmers, as 
the land distributed to campesinos, particularly under the Pinochet regime, was often 
marginal land in the hills on either side of the more fertile plains. (Kay, 1971; 1997a) 
Under Pinochet land was also allocated to campesinos on a loan-repayment basis, and 
auctioned off to the highest bidder when loans were not repaid. This was the beginning of the 
re-concentration of land ownership heralded by authors such as Cristóbal Kay and Warwick 
Murray which, in addition to powerlessness against large agribusinesses, appears to be 
creating a new generation of land-less campesinos who increasingly rely on poorly-paid and 
seasonal labour to substitute their income (Kay, 1971; 1997a; Murray 1994; 2006). The 
Government of Chile increasingly plays a more active role in campesino agriculture and has 
                                                 
4
 Casual labourers were also present, in addition to campesinos. They did not produce on a specific area of land, 
but subsisted on wages (often low wages) paid by the land-owner (Pilotti, 1979; Robles-Ortiz, 2009) 
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developed a series of agencies to assist all producers but also, specifically those with the 
smallest lands.  
Government  
Two government agencies, under the Ministry of Agriculture, are influential within the 
current framework of development in campesino agriculture. INDAP (El Instituto de 
Desarrollo Agropecuario, The Institute of Agricultural Development) is the national 
government agency for agricultural development. Its local-level subdivision, PRODESAL 
(Programa de Desarrollo Local, Programme for local Development), has a specific mandate 
to assist campesinos at the local level. They must have less than 5ha of basic irrigated land 
and no more than 20ha in total. (INDAP 2013) 
PRODESAL  
“[To]…improve agricultural production and livestock smallholder farmers, through the 
delivery of technical assistance and investment funds.” – Mission statement of 
PRODESAL (PRODESAL: 2013). 
PRODESAL works throughout Chile at the local-government level, offering advice, grants, 
training and other extension services to small-scale farmers. Grants are given through a 
competition style development-funding programme in which eligible campesinos may submit 
a proposal for a development
5
 project on their farm. Winners are selected based on the 
funding availability and potential benefit of the projects. Funding (supplied by INDAP) is 
then granted up to a value of 95%, with the remainder being paid by the successful farmer.  
Three productive groups are targeted by PRODESAL. The first are producers who are mainly 
engaged in subsistence farming, with little surplus for sale. The second are those who are 
“overcoming the stage of subsistence and livelihood agriculture” 6  and who have higher 
surpluses to take to market. The final group are those who engage as a small business in 
formal markets. The underlying purpose of PRODESAL is to move people from subsistence 
agriculture towards these markets
7
. (PRODESAL, 2013) 
                                                 
5
 Development is defined in this thesis as a change of positive value for the intended recipient. 
6
 Noting the wording of the second group, taken from the PRODDESAL website, the view of campesino 
agriculture is explicitly negative, as something to be overcome. 
7
 The market being formal national and international markets 
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Geographical Issues 
Climate variability, particularly precipitation variability is risk factor of the agricultural cycle 
of the Central Valley (Montecinos and Aceituno, 2002).  Precipitation in the Bío-Bío region 
over the previous thirty years has ranged from 1800mm (1982) to 421mm (1998), averaging 
1050mm (Meteorological Agency, 2012) caused by the El Niño Southern Oscillation (ESNO) 
(Montecinos and Aceituno, 2002:282; Muñoz et al., 2007; Muñoz, Arumí and Rivera, 
2013:8; Rutllant and Fuenzalida, 1991). Precipitation is highly seasonal and in the summer 
months rainfall is rare. Likewise the snowpack depth of the Bío-Bío Andes which supplies 
much of the irrigation to the study area is variable coinciding with ESNO events, with a 
maximum snow-water-equivalent of over 2000mm in 1982 compared to less than 250mm in 
1998 (Masiokas et al. 2006:6341). This water, in addition to supplying irrigation canals, also 
helps recharge ground water reserves (Muñoz, Arumí and Rivera, 2013).  
Chile has a tradable Water Rights system with which users can feely buy, sell and own 
access to water (Bauer, 2004; Budds, 2004). 
Guiding Concepts 
Campesinos and farmers 
Campesinos
8
 are primarily subsistence agriculturalists who may engage in the market and 
who are culturally tied to the land, whereas farmers can be seen as market-oriented non-
subsistence agriculturalists, who usually own larger plots through which they gain income. 
There is also a degree of blurring between farmers and campesinos. It is recognised that many 
campesinos also engage (increasingly) in the market system and may have larger plots than 
average. According to INDAP and their sub-division PRODESAL, small-scale farms are 
                                                 
8
 There is debate surrounding the correct term for campesinos or peasants in Latin American agriculture 
(Kearney 1996, Loker 1996). Loker (1996: 71) summarises that the translation of ‘campesino’ to ‘person of the 
land’ and subsequently “peasant” in English, hides numerous cultural factors and engagements in a variety of 
economic activities. He states that: “They often engage in diversiﬁed agriculture on relatively small farms.” 
Social characteristics caused by asset and income poverty include “dependence on household labour8…diverse 
production strategies…producing food crops for cash sale and home consumption…market-oriented cash 
crops…[and]…diverse income generating strategies on- and off-farm,” Loker (1996: 71-72). In contrast, the 
term peasant in English defines only that the person is a worker of the land and may or may not own a 
smallholding and does not denote any cultural associations. For these reasons I will utilise the term campesino. 
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farms with less than 20ha (hectares) of land and less than 5ha of irrigated land (INDAP 2013). 
Campesinos cannot be categorised by land size, but for this study all campesinos except one 
fall into this definition. Hence campesinos in this study will be denoted as those who have 
come from a tradition of subsistence agriculture, who engage in subsistence agriculture today 
(regardless of whether they produce for the market), and who have less than 20ha of land (see 
below). Those outside these definitions will be termed farmers, though where there are 
overlapping features this will become part of the discussion. 
Medium - Large-scale farmers 
According to a Food and Agriculture Organisation (FAO) Report (1996), Chilean agriculture 
is defined as 12ha for small scale farming, 13-199ha for medium and 200ha above classed as 
large scale. Due to the importance of government institutions in this study only farms above 
20ha in size will be considered medium-scale, as defined by the Chilean government (INDAP 
2013) 20ha (see above). As the definition of medium and large-scale farms is less critical to 
the study, the FAO (1996) report serves to define the latter. As none of the medium or large-
scale farmers interviewed were borderline cases this was deemed a practical definition.  
Poverty 
Throughout this paper the term campesino will be used. Through his description that 
campesinos have asset and income poverty Loker (1996:71) accepts that most campesinos 
would fall within Chambers and Jiggins’ (1987) definition of “Resource poor farmers”. This 
term is used by Chambers and Jiggins to define the aspects which make campesinos poor. 
They include a lack of cash income, land, capital, access to resources such as credit, 
healthcare, education and other resources (Chambers and Jiggins, 1987; Loker, 1996:71). 
Poverty is not a clearly defined phenomenon, nor do I seek to provide a definitive insight into 
poverty, only that many of the campesinos interviewed do lack access to at least some 
resources and therefore literature surrounding these lacks in resources is applicable. 
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Methodology 
Research Design 
This research brings into discussion some of the aspects related to the complex area of risk-
decision in peasant agriculture. It is illustrated using primary data from campesinos and 
farmers in the Central Valley of the Bío-Bío region of Chile. Theoretical analysis is 
conducted through literature, which guides the understanding of perceptions related to risk 
and production.  
As such this research is qualitative in nature. It brings an abductive approach in that it 
attempts to produce redescriptions and understandings of the motives of the participants, 
through which the theoretical concepts may be explored (Buchanan and Bryman, 2009:439). 
It follows an iterative process whereby primary data was collected before theoretical study, to 
ensure a broad, open-minded approach to the perceptions of risk among participants. 
Subsequently, ideas formed through this process were engaged with theoretical discussion. 
The theoretical frames drawn out are thus applied to the empirical data collected to forge a 
deeper understanding of the research questions. This occurs through a series of three 
hypotheses, developed from the literature, which frame the analysis and the interplay between 
theory and primary data. 
 A social constructivist standpoint is applied to the analysis of primary data, outlined by 
Bryman (2008) and Burr (2003) who states that “social constructivism regards as the proper 
focus of our enquiry as the social practices engaged in by people, and their interactions with 
each other” (Burr, 2003:9).  In this way it attempts not to uncover ‘truth’ but to seek to 
understand the diverse ways in which the social world is constructed according to different 
actors. This study is based in my comprehension of social constructs, as actor of 
comprehension in the research. The comprehension I shape will be influenced by my role as a 
non-native researcher with limited cultural and linguistic understanding, as outlined below. 
Evaluation Criteria 
Given the qualitative nature of this study it is important to recognise that data from 
respondents is subjective to their situation and also to my interpretation. Validating these 
results externally – that is to say generalising the findings across the social setting (LeCompte 
and Goetz in Bryman, 2008:376) – is not possible given the small number of participants in 
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the study, and will not be attempted. To improve internal validation of the empirical data 
attempts are made to triangulate the data through preliminary interviews and also through 
regular discussions with co-workers at the university (Bryman, 2008). All of these 
researchers are involved in agriculture and have strong links to farmers and campesinos in the 
region. In addition I use personal observations from interview locations, on transect walks 
and notes taken during the interview process. 
I am aware that my personal social role within the interviews, as an ‘educated’ yet non-
Spanish-speaking European male may distort the responses to my interviews through 
misunderstandings and mistrust of my intentions, among other unknowns. Participants may, 
for example, be unwilling to engage in certain topics with a perceived outsider. Having 
considered this situation attempts are made to improve the reliability of my interpretations 
through internally corroborated discussions with my native interpreters. This occurred after 
each interview, notes were taken to clarify our combined opinions and thus understandings. 
This is particularly important to clarify any mistranslations which may have misguided my 
perceptions. 
Unit of Analysis: 
Risk-decisions are taken as the unit of analysis. Risk decisions have both an individual value 
and purpose, though these values and purposes are subjective. Primarily this has been taken 
from theoretical literature surrounding risk decision, with a focus on peasant farming, but will 
include the risk-decisions of campesinos and farmers also. 
Subjects of analysis: 
Campesino and farmer household units are the subjects of analysis. Although each campesino 
or farmer is an individual, decisions are deemed to be placed in the context of the family, 
ecosystem and geographical context. The aspirations held and decisions taken thus may not 
be solely by the individual; they must be seen in the context of other family members who 
may be dependents or joint decision makers. As the participants of the primary data 
collection phase they are interviewed in private, where possible, using an interview guide 
(see appendix 1). Theoretical data from literature is illustrated by the primary data from 
subjects of analysis. 
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Data Collection and Analysis 
Both secondary data in the form of theoretical literature, and primary data, in the form of 
interviews to illustrate the secondary data, were used to in the process of this study.  
Secondary Data 
As a theoretical discussion, the basis for the hypotheses is found in theories relating to 
secondary data sources in previous studies. Applicable data was located using a sifting 
process of relevant searches of academic literature and government documents. Government 
sources were used to establish background data such as climatic or government intervention 
strategies and statistical data. Triangulation of data was completed also using information 
gathered from agricultural researchers at the University of Concepción, my host university 
for the study. 
Primary Data 
Data was collected in the form of semi-structured interviews, outlined below, with 
participants chosen via a process of purposive sampling, as outlined by Bryman (2008:458). 
This sampling method was employed for two reasons: 1) due to the difficulty of obtaining 
farmers for interview, which lead to 2) the need to ensure that there was a good 
correspondence between the research question and the data (Bryman 2008). 
Campesinos were the primary subjects of the research though a small number of medium and 
large-scale farmers were engaged to broaden the perspective of risks in the area and to allow 
a better understanding of which risks are shared by all agriculturalists and which by only 
certain sectors. It was also for the purpose of exploring divergent aspirations between groups.  
Observations 
Observations were carried out throughout my time in Chile and included observations made 
while interviewing farmers, their home-situation, surroundings and – where possible – 
transects walks of their farms. It also included the quality of the irrigation network and other 
factors such as the size and location of farms and farm buildings. Observations were also 
taken in local markets where many farmers sell their produce in the Dry-Coastal and Valley-
Plains study locations. 
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Site of Study 
The Primary data collection took place in the region surrounding Chillán City, in three 
geographically distinct zones across the valley. The interview location was not seen as critical 
to the research design. The zones, defined by INDAP (see above), were selected for their 
geographical distinctions which may impact risks. They are described below. Research sites 
within each study zone were selected through the availability of participants. With the 
exception of one, interviews were conducted in clustered areas with farmers and campesinos 
in close proximity to improve the interpretation of socially constructed realities. The selection 
method is outlined below. 
Map of study area and subject’s farm locations. 
 
Figure 1: Map of interview locations and zones
9
. In the Central Plain the campesinos are denoted with 
three yellow pins, medium and large-scale farmers with blue pins. In the Andes Cordillera range both the 
campesinos and the farmers’ lands are indicated with green pins. In the Dry Coastal zone three 
interviews with campesinos took place in the southern cluster of pale blue pins, the other pale blue pin 
denotes the medium scale farmer in the region. Black lines demark the approximate transition point 
between each microclimatic zone, outlined below. (Source: Google, 2013) 
Interview sites and participant selection 
Three zones were selected from INDAP (2013) who identify each as geographically distinct 
in terms of micro-climatic and topographic factors which may influence agriculture. 
                                                 
9
 Where interviews did not occur on the farm itself the approximate location is shown, taken from the interview 
data.  
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Zone 1- Andes Cordillera (A) 
Two campesinos and two farmers
10
 were interviewed. All participants were located in the 
same village. All contacts were made through a gate-keeper at the university and, 
subsequently though his contacts in the village. One further campesino declined the pre-
arranged interview citing other business to attend to. 
Zone 2 – Central Valley Plain (V) 
Seven interviews were conducted, including one medium-scale and three large scale farmers, 
often on adjoining land and contacted though a consultant at a private agricultural company. 
Three campesinos were also interviewed, obtained through the local government 
PRODESAL office.  
Zone 3-Dry Costal (C) 
Four campesinos were contacted though one was not present at the scheduled time and no 
other arrangements could be made. All three remaining participant campesinas
11
 were female 
and were engaged in trade at the local market stalls, where two of the interviews took place. 
These interviews were obtained through organic farming Civil Society Organisation known 
as CET (Centro de Educacíon y Tecnología). A further medium-scale farmer participated, 
organised through a contact at the university. 
In total fifteen interviews took place. Interviews were carried out between September and 
November 2012. Ideally the research would have included more than ten interviews with 
campesinos in each zone as this would have improved the generalisability of the data, though 
this was not possible due to time and contact limitations. 
Interview Process 
Preliminary Interviews 
Two preliminary interviews were also conducted prior to the formal interview process with 
an organic farmer in the Valley Plains zone and a researcher from the University of 
Concepción. These interviews were designed to inform my future interview guide through 
acquisition of the correct terminology, local issues and other factors which were important to 
comprehend as a relative outsider to Chilean agriculture. Particular attention was focussed on 
                                                 
10
 One farmer identified as a campesino, which will be discussed below 
11
 Campesinas is the plural female form of campesinos (which denotes either a mixed or wholly male group. 
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structure of the market systems and cultural aspects relating to interviews. Both of these 
participants spoke English so a translator was not required. 
Formal Interviews 
Interviews were conducted with the help of an interpreter and recorded. Discussions were 
based on an interview guide. Each interview was to last approximately between 30 minutes 
and one hour. The interviews were conducted at a site convenient to the participant, which 
was usually their home or a field. This was due to the fact that to secure an interview with a 
campesinos and farmers was incredibly difficult during working hours. Interviews were thus 
conducted in a location both convenient and comfortable and chosen participants.  
Interviews focussed on four aspects. Initial questions related to the type of agriculture 
employed, demographic and technical questions such as farm size, dependents and crops 
grown. The second group related to aspirations and were purposefully open to interpretation 
of the word ‘aspirations’ as this was thought to be indicative of the decision process entered 
by producers. The third group related to risks and the market, harvesting and other factors. 
The final group of questions related to the future investments planned. This was designed to 
round off the interview by bring aspirations back into focus in the new environment having 
discussed perceptions of risks and the farm. Questions generally followed the same order, but 
as the interviews were semi-structured there was a degree of flexibility as I attempted to 
follow participants thought paths (Bryman, 2008). All major points in interviews were 
transcribed with the help of interpreters. In one case the entire interview was transcribed 
using a separate interpreter as I was unsure of the quality of the interpretation given during 
the interview. 
Interpreters 
Four interpreters were used. Each was chosen primarily by availability and linguistic ability. 
Though one interpreter would have been beneficial to forge an understanding relationship 
with the research, it was not possible with the contacts available and the necessity of day-time 
research
12
. Three of the interpreters were students and one a professor of the host university. 
The first interpreter, an engineering student, took a relatively deductive standpoint to 
interpreting the questions. His method was to summarise responses rather than interpret the 
                                                 
12
 Interviews were not possible in the evening due to the difficulty of finding locations and arranging phone calls 
through gate-keepers, who I could only contact during the day. This is addition to the fact that participants 
generally arranged a time suitable for themselves, which was invariably during the day time.  
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speech. He was used for the first two interviews only as he failed to interpret important 
information relating to why a participant was upset.  
Two of the interpreters were English-Teaching students. They were female and took a more 
inductive approach to the research questions, occasionally posing appropriate additions to 
elicit further response when they believed necessary. This helped make a smoother interview 
process. They were used for the majority of the interviews.  
The final interpreter was a professor of the university and his approach was deductive in 
nature, his interpretations gave clear logic and reasoning to the responses elicited. He 
occasionally cut short responses, believing he had summarised the point well, though, as I 
understand some Spanish, I was able to pick up on important points and ask him to expand 
upon these points when necessary. 
Ethical Considerations 
When organising interviews I ensured that prospective participants were informed of the 
research purpose so participants were aware of the goals and areas of investigation. Before 
each interview, I again explained the research in more detail and asked if they had any 
questions. I did not start any interview if I felt there was doubt as to their understanding of 
my work. I made sure participants were aware that the interview was confidential and real 
names would not be used. They were aware that I was from a Swedish University, not 
affiliated with my host university, the Government of Chile or its departments. I became 
aware however that many of my contacts through PRODESAL could have inferred my 
affiliation to the organisation. This incorporates a number of issues of potential bias, as 
campesinos were likely to have been beneficiaries of PRODESAL’s development projects 
and may feel obliged to promote them. Once aware of this issue I ensured that those who may 
affiliate me with government research were noted in my research diary. 
Coding of respondents: 
Farmers were coded to ensure confidentiality, but also to allow quick reference to their 
situation. For the purposes of easy recognition I have given each of the interviewees a 
pseudonym, reflecting their gender. This is followed by a two letter code, which denotes the 
zone and the size of the farm.  
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The first letter of participant code refers to the location: Andes Cordillera (A), Valley Plains 
(V) or Dry-coastal (C).  The second letter corresponds to the size of the farm: Large (L) over 
200ha, Medium (M) 21-199ha, Small (S) less than 20ha. (See definitions above)  
Gender  
Efforts were made to include both male and female farmers in the interview process. It was 
noted that in the dry-coastal zone, where majority of interviews were selected through one a 
contact who deals with PRODESAL, the farmers available for interview were all female and 
all took part in the PRODESAL-organised market stalls. Only one other participant, Maria, a 
large-scale farmer, was female. There is no specific gender focus of this research, though its 
relevance is not discounted. Through the host organisation and colleagues, I understood that 
there may be a cultural propensity to hide negative perceptions of oneself, especially among 
men
13
. This was widely purported to be part of the machismo culture notable in Chile. Being 
aware of this was important in interview process as it forms an important aspect of 
perceptions and which responses may require more detailed analysis. 
Discussion methodology 
The discussion is based in the analysis of hypotheses. These have been developed through the 
iterative approach taken; construction of the theoretical framework developed initially from 
empirical data collection in the field. They are proposed in order to guide analysis of how 
these frameworks can be understood in the context of Chilean campesinos, with illustration 
from the primary data. 
The initial stage of the discussion will be to debate the merits of theoretical arguments of risk 
decision and campesino agriculture. The data provided from the interviews forms the second 
part of the research, where perceptions of risks and personal aspirations are analysed in 
relation to each other and also to the theoretical framework.  This aspect of the research is 
brought to the discussion where relevant to provide a real-world situation to the debate. The 
hypotheses set out above will be analysed in relation to the theoretical frame and analysis of 
the data. 
                                                 
13
 An important example of this was flagged while conducting other work for the host organisation, where two 
men responded to a multiple choice questionnaire reflecting their leadership abilities. Self-scoring from 1-7 
(seven being ‘most like me’). Though not all the questions posed a positive impression if one were to answer 
“7”, both men marked nearly every category with this number, believing it represented them as strong. When I 
asked a colleague they responded “…it’s not a good idea to directly ask a man an opinion about himself.”  
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Interviews with large-scale farmers are used to illustrate differences and similarities in the 
risk-decision rational of farmers and their respective aspirations. This is particularly 
important to the discussion of the theory of risk adversity among campesinos as it may (or 
may not) highlight potential divergence of perceptions based on economic or cultural outlook. 
In addition similar decisions and aspirations may also highlight interesting and important 
aspects in the nature of risk-decision based on economic and cultural factors. 
The discussion will be able to bring specific examples to the discussion, but cannot, due to its 
scale, attempt generalisations about the nature of risk-decisions among campesinos in Chile. 
Instead it seeks to provide a credible set of examples through which the impact of aspirations 
on risks can be better understood. An outline of the analytical themes linking the 
Methodology to the Theoretical Framework can be found in appendix 2. 
 
Theoretical Framework 
This section is informed by themes and elements of the primary data collected in the field. It 
is constructed to form an analytical frame for discussion of perceptions of agricultural risk 
and the interpretive power it may have in debates surrounding the future of campesino 
agriculture. 
Agricultural Risk 
To understand some of the complexity of risk-decisions in agriculture it is important to define 
some the most important risk factors. Below are summarised extracts from Moschini and 
Hennesy (2001) to set out the broad terms which define uncertainty in agricultural production 
and will be referred to throughout this research: 
Production Uncertainty – The amount of output from a given number of inputs is 
uncertain. It refers to uncontrollable factors impacting production such as the weather 
and biological processes. 
Price Uncertainty – Production uncertainty and a lag between decision (planting) and 
known final price (after harvesting) cause price uncertainty. In addition, fluctuations in 
demand can cause price shocks, especially when dealing with the export market. 
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Technological Uncertainty – the appearance of technologies which serve to increase 
the competitiveness of producers is an unquantifiable and hence random knowledge 
development process.  
Policy Uncertainty – Exchange rates, interest rates, taxes and regulations are examples 
leading to uncertainty in the agricultural sector. In addition, the direct interventions 
which many governments employ for a variety of reasons causes uncertainty as polies 
may change.  
  (Moschini and Hennesy 2001: 89-90) 
Moschini and Hennesy (2001) describe risk and uncertainty as ubiquitous. For clarification, 
uncertainty can be seen as situation of not knowing an outcome; a risk has the added 
dimension that a decision must be made under uncertain conditions. Many of the above terms 
overlap and indeed some exist for the purpose of reducing risks from others. Government 
policies may, for example, try to influence price uncertainty through imposing taxes on 
imports. Likewise, technology is often utilised to reduce production uncertainties through 
irrigation, for example, which in turn will influence prices; thus creating the complex world 
of agricultural risks. Moschini and Hennesy (2001) 
The Theory of the Optimising Peasant 
Lipton’s 1968 Theory of the Optimising Peasant issued a challenge to a contemporary 
theorist Theodore Shultz’ “efficient-but-poor” hypothesis in Transforming Traditional 
Agriculture (1964). This was one of the earliest pieces of economic theory to claim that, far 
from being irrational and inefficient, peasant farmers
14
 were actually remarkably efficient, 
though they remained poor (Dhindsa and Sharma 2001:222, Shultz 1964,Lipton 1968).  
Lipton does not deny this notion, but rejects the hypothesis on the grounds that Shultz work is 
based in the theory that each peasant farmer maximises his/her utility
15
 and therefore prevents 
inefficiency, known as employing the “Marginal Value-Product of Money Equation” 
(MVPE) (Lipton 1968:329). Lipton claims that achieving the up to the MVPE would be 
                                                 
14
 Discussions in economic theory surround the issue of peasant farmers. This thesis accepts that, though 
culturally distinct, campesinos form a group off peasant farmers and thus discussion in relation to peasant 
farmers is applicable. 
15
 The value of production 
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impossible in reality because peasants have multiple uncertainties to contend with. Hence 
they must lower their marginal utility and concentrate on a “safety-first” approach of meeting 
a minimum. The following factors outlined by Lipton dismiss the principle of efficiency 
maximisation through marginal-production calculation as overly simplistic in the real world: 
 Peasants may not be efficient but poor because they have to contend with 
production uncertainty such as rainfall variation. They have to contend with 
probabilities which will reduce their efficiency. 
 To contend with uncertainty MVPE is possible, but not optimal (due to the risk of 
loss). Hence a “Risk Premium” is applied by farmers to mitigate risk of serious ill-
effects such as malnutrition related to crop losses. 
 Even without production uncertainty there will be price uncertainty in the market. 
Thus utility maximisation is nearly impossible as the final price of optional crops 
will not be known until harvest.  
 Even under certainty of both production and price uncertainty there will be cultural 
factors which dictate crop choices, sowing patterns, labour supply and other factors. 
 Different peasant farmers have learnt to utilise their own methods of production 
which fit their abilities, knowledge and skills. There is no single fixed MVPE. 
 Other burdens such as debts are not taken into account, which may necessitate 
selling below the optimal price to service the debt. 
(Lipton 1968:329-332) 
Shultz’ theory is based on the economic principle of Perfect Competition, which in reality 
does not exist. Instead, Lipton claims that peasant farmers optimise their production based on 
their needs and their insecurities in order to ensure optimum production. They are likely to be 
risk averse against loss and base their production on a survival first policy (Lipton, 1968). 
The Peasant Economy Continuum 
Campesinistas and Decampmesinistas  
The debate about the future of campesinos can be broadly split into two schools of thought – 
Campesinistas and Decampmesinistas (Murray 2006:648). In the former the view taken is 
that capitalism will not bring about the demise of the peasant economy and hence peasant 
livelihoods. This is exemplified by the early 20
th
 Century works of Chayanov (Chayanov, 
1966; Chayanov 1974 in Bernstein, 2009). Conversely, decapmesinistas suggest that the 
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spread and expansion of capitalism renders peasant agriculture uncompetitive, eroding the 
peasant economy and hence leaves peasants vulnerable to exploitation by large-scale 
agricultural farms (Murray 2006). This debate is particularly pertinent to the future of 
campesinos in Chile. With a history of neoliberal policies, Chilean campesinos have become 
an example for both sides of the debate. In the middle ground there are also theories of how 
to interpret the current situation of campesinos in the capitalist system. Some interpretations 
offer solutions to the perceived problem. The neo-structuralist approach, outlined below, is 
one of these solutions. Championed by some scholars (Kay, 2002; Kirkby, 2009; Sunkel, 
1993), it typifies this balance and has become prevalent in Chilean Government policies in 
recent years. It has been criticised by authors such as Warwick Murray as perpetuating the 
export-oriented neoliberal paradigm which undermines the peasant economy (Murray 2006, 
Murray and Overton 2011).  
Murray also proposes the theory of the Peasant Economy being on a linear continuum, 
placing these two dichotomies at either end of a linear scale, thus encapsulating the wide 
spectrum of realities within the current campesino system in Chile (Murray 2006:648). An 
explanation of the two dichotomies follows. 
Campesinistas 
Chayanov’s development of Peasant Economy in 1924 is an example of the campesinista 
school of thought (Bernstein, 2009; Murray, 2006). His work, translated into English in 1966, 
is still taken as a founding principle of peasant economy and its differentiation from capitalist 
agricultural theory (Bernstein, 2009; Millar, 1970). Chayanov developed four principles of 
the peasant economy: 1) That they typically only employed family hence the term “family-
labour farm”, 2) that the intensity of workload was related to the ratio of working to non-
working family members, 3) that farm size was corresponded to family size as families grew 
and shrank, not to economic success, and 4) that family labour farms could both survive and 
succeed against capitalist farms (Millar, 1970). He also took the view that peasants were not 
capitalists seeking profit but workers sustaining themselves, and that it was impossible to 
measure these profits as labour was auto-applied and profits (production) were mainly auto-
consumed (Chayanov, 1966; Millar 1970). Peasants were distinct from capitalism, formed 
into unique family units of economic production (Chayanov, 1966). In this vein it is possible 
to view campesino agriculture as free from the capitalist system in Chile, surviving on family 
labour for economic autonomy. Authors such as Hayami (1996) describe how peasant 
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agriculture may also incorporate in capitalist system, stating that in every nation’s 
agricultural export economy it is possible to find peasant farmers engaging and succeeding in 
the production. This is ostensibly due to the benefits of the “family-labour farm” described by 
Chayanov, reducing costs relative to capitalist farmers by self-exploitation (Chayanov, 1966; 
Hayami, 1996). 
Decampmesinistas  
In contrast, Murray (2006) points to the drive of capitalism to create economic growth, not to 
reduce inequality. He states that due to a myriad of factors peasants increasingly become 
servants to the capitalist system, and that a form of depeasantisation is occurring. In the case 
of Chile, in recent years (1990-2000) he points to the loss of land, described as “re-
concentration”, which has led to a marginalisation of campesinos. This had led to an 
increased reliance on employment on large-scale farms, which is often seasonal and 
genderised (where women are preferred for fruit picking (Kay, 2002)). This, he claims, has 
led to proletarianisation. In addition, those who retain their land are often controlled by large 
agribusinesses which control the supply chain of produce (Murray, 2006; Murray and 
Overton, 2011). These fears are echoed by Kay (2002) and are exemplifications of Lenin’s 
principles for the transition of the Russian Peasantry in Marxist Russia, whereby Lenin hoped 
to turn a polymorphic peasantry into socialised large-scale farming sector (Bernstein, 2009). 
This was to be achieved through a capitalistic transition via the encouraging of rich capitalist 
peasants to dominate production, creating a proletarianised peasantry from the smaller, less 
competitive farms (Bernstein, 2009). 
The Peasant Economy Continuum theory thus depends on the ability of (and extent to which) 
capitalist farmers and markets to dominate peasant agriculture. Given that decapmesinistas 
are concerned with proletarianisation through land control and or unstable labour markets, the 
continuum equally depends on the abilities of campesinos to retain their independence 
through risk management. Where a campesinos lies on this continuum thus depends on the 
level of independence he/she has from the capitalist market and hence their reliance upon it. 
This level of independence is likely to depend, in some cases, on the time of year, as off-farm 
income opportunities vary seasonally and by location (Bee and Vogel, 1997; Echeverría et al, 
2009; Kay, 1997). 
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Neo-Structuralism 
Neo-structuralism descends from the structuralist views held by international organisations 
such as the UN Economic commission for Latin America (CEPAL) throughout the 1950s and 
60s (Kirby, 2009). The principles behind structuralism were policies of state control of 
economic systems such as trade and attempts to tackle inequality through industrialisation 
processes and international exports (Kirby, 2009; Love, 2005). In the wake of a new age 
neoliberalism encouraged by the World Bank, structuralism lost favour to market forces and 
trade liberalisation (Kirby, 2009). Today a new phase of neo-structuralism is taking shape. It 
is focussed again on state mediation in areas left behind by trade liberalisation (Love, 2005). 
The Campesinos are one such area. Neo-structuralism thus attempts to assist campesino 
agriculture though government policies, improving access to appropriate modern 
technologies and practices (Kay, 2002; Gwynne and Kay, 2000). This is known as 
Modernisation Theory. 
Modernisation 
Modernisation defines the act of transitioning to from the old, or traditional to the more 
modern and typically advanced. In a development context Modernisation Theory can refer to 
the 1950s and 60s rationale of economic and social development of what was then termed the 
Third-World (Ploeg et al., 2000). As with structuralism this too has undergone a 
transformation towards a more bottom-up approach (Kay, 2002; Ploeg et al., 2000). Scholars 
such as Kay (2002) still define the term within neo-structuralist agricultural development 
theory as government-led assistance to modernise peasant agriculture. As a caveat, however, 
Kay (2002) emphasises the need to use site-specific, sustainable tools and technologies in 
Chile, rather than the broad sweeping revolutions of post war Europe and the Green 
Revolution (Hardeman and Jochemsen, 2012; Horlings and Marsden, 2011; Ploeg et al., 
2000).  
Summary 
This research seeks to analyse theories pertaining to campesino risk decisions in the wider 
and draw examples from detailed interviews in the study area. The research will draw on 
historical and cultural factors, which are viewed as important in influencing aspirations and 
motivations for risk-seeking or risk-aversion. It will also draw on major influences on risks in 
the region’s agriculture – climate and the market. 
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Discussion 
Hypothesis 1 
Theories of risk decision will apply to the Theory of the Optimising Peasant 
This section sets out a largely theoretical analysis relating to risk which will be illustrated 
with empirical study data throughout the proceeding sections. 
Lipton states that in contrast to the perfect competition modelled “Efficient-but-Poor” 
hypothesis postulated by Shultz (1964), producers also have to contend with production and 
price uncertainties. Under this uncertainty the Marginal Value of Productivity
16
 (MYPE) 
which reinforces Shultz’ argument is possible, but not optimal, due to the risk of loss (Lipton, 
1968). A “Risk Premium” would be required, with the risk being formidable (crop losses, 
food shortages) if there is failure. A risk-decision is thus employed to optimise productivity, 
producing below the maximum, but doing do securely (Lipton, 1968; Moschini and Hennesy, 
2001). Exploring how risk decisions are taken is important to understanding the optimisations 
strategy proposed. 
Empirical research from a wide variety of disciplines has shown that humans have a complex 
relationship with risk-decision-making (Clarke, 1980; Dhindsa and Sharma, 2001; Diecidue 
and Van der Ven, 2008; Festinger, 1942; 1954; Friedman and Savage, 1948; Kuhl, 1978; 
Henrich and Mcelreath, 2002; Kahneman and Tversky, 1979). Many of the current and 
established theories point to the fact that humans are not entirely rational in behaviour as they 
must contend with multiple influences. People are often risk averse, especially in the face of 
poverty (Clarke, 1980; Diecidue and Van der Ven, 2008; Kahneman and Tversky, 1979; 
Lipton, 1968) and that risks-decisions are based highly, in addition to possibility of success, 
on aspirations (Festinger, 1942; 1954; Quagila and Cobb, 1996). 
Risk Theory 
Risk decision began to be formalised by Milton Friedman and Leonard J. Savage in 1948. 
Expected Utility (EU) Theory became the benchmark for studies surrounding risk decisions. 
                                                 
16
 An economic principle which states that producers will maximise production until the marginal value of each 
extra product reaches the cost of production 
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It states that an individual will make a decision to receive the best possible outcome from a 
given number of options, according to their expected value, multiplied by the probability of it 
occurring (Friedman and Savage, 1948; Mongin, 1997). Mongin (1997) summarises many of 
the subsequent studies which outlined the need for subjective perceptions of probability and 
utility. 
Prospect Theory (PT) attempts to categorise this, showing that some pervasive behavioural 
traits are not entirely rational. Kahneman and Tversky (1979) state that “…people 
underweight outcomes which are probable in comparison with outcomes which are obtained 
with certainty,” – implying that people are risk averse given the choice. 
This offers empirical evidence to show that decision makers are likely to overweight
17
 the 
probability of a negative event occurring, that is, they perceive it as more likely to occur than 
in reality it would; this is particularly the case in situations of poverty
18
 (Diecidue and Van 
der Ven 2008, Henrich and Mcelreath 2002, Kahneman and Tversky 1979). This conforms to 
PT’s insurance against loss principles and hence both support OP Theory as a predictor of 
peasant strategies. 
Conversely, individuals were found to underweight highly probable situations (Kahneman 
and Tversky 1979); thus not detracting from OP Theory which states that peasants will avoid 
risk based on uncertainty. However it adds that optimisation may be perceived at a level 
below the actual optimum level according to risk calculation alone. Thus perceptions of risk 
are as, if not more, important than the actual risk level when decision are made. 
Kahneman and Tversky (1979) also show that individuals will underweight their chance of 
achieving the maximum and settle for less, but will overweight their chances of retaining 
their current situation. This appears to conflict with OP Theory as it supposes that peasants 
would be more likely to risk a loss than the same amount of gain. However, this depends on 
the relative value of loss and gain, hence context and perception is again important. 
OP Theory suggests that peasant optimisers will be averse to risky decisions when given the 
alternative of lower risk, with lower utility but better chance. Risk theories support this, but 
suggest that it remains dependent upon the severity of loss to be made (Diecidue and Van der 
                                                 
17
 Weighting refers to the perceived chance of the action occurring. Underweighting would show a reduced 
perceived chance of occurrence relative to the probability, overweighting shows the opposite 
18
 This does not suggest that campesinos are necessarily in poverty only that losses may lead to an economically 
impoverished situation. 
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Ven, 2008; Henrich and Mcelreath, 2002; Kahneman and Tversky, 1979). Hence it should be 
the case that campesinos will protect their absolute minimum level more than subsequent 
losses. 
The utility of an outcome may change depending on a number of factors, notably its relative 
scarcity. Henrich and Mcelreath (2002:172) demonstrate decreasing marginal utility
19
 is 
influential in the decision making process of peasant farmers. This is more pronounced when 
farmers are concerned with meeting a minimum income with certainty, than achieving the 
maximum, stating that “…they give greater values to initial gains than subsequent gains.” 
(Henrich and Mcelreath, 2002:172). This conforms to OP Theory, relating to risk and 
highlights the issue of aspiration, claiming that peasants aspire to a minimum level of 
production and that added production is decreasingly pursued. An example of this is that 
extra (marginal) production may involve shifting production patterns or increasing initial 
costs, hence involving more risk of loss. A campesino seeking to meet a minimum would 
thus be more inclined to remain risk-averse. In contrast, farmers – as profit maximising 
producers – are more likely to pursue marginal productivity in order to maximise yields. As 
non-auto-consumers they are likely to be more motivated by yield maximisation as they 
severity of the loss, described above, will hinge largely on their productivity. 
Spears (2012) suggests that there is a link between poverty and risk decisions, showing 
evidence that the economically disadvantaged take riskier decisions on the basis of simplicity, 
rather than most advantageous outcome value, or utility. This is suggested to be due to the 
fact that more complex risk, despite reducing the chances of failure or maximising returns, 
represent “compound risks” – to which those already facing many compounding layers of 
poverty may be averse to (Spears, 2012). When applying this to campesinos through OP 
Theory, this will reduce the productivity of the farm and gives weight to the ‘safety-first’ 
principle of risk minimisation outlined by Lipton (1968). 
Aspirations and Risks 
“Aspirations are often the determining factor of risk decisions”. Kahneman and 
Tversky (1979:273) 
Aspirations are a key factor in determining risk choices (Henrich and Mcelreath, 2002; 
Diecidue and Van der Ven, 2008; and Kahneman and Tversky, 1979:273). Yet PT and EU 
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 This is the principle that as you acquire more of something each additional item will be worth marginally less. 
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theories do not account for the complexity of aspiration, only for utility or value. Diecidue 
and Van der Ven (2008) suggest that where an aspiration may be lost, a risk-averse decision 
will be made in order to preserve it. However, as the following research shows, aspirations 
are partly a social construction and must be considered as such. 
Clarke (1980) describes risks not as uncertainty of outcome, but as “…a perceived inability to 
cope satisfactorily with the world around us.” He continues by stating that risks are “…a 
problem of identifying and carrying out the actions which will change the rules of the game 
so that the game becomes more to our liking” (Clarke 1980:287). 
Level of aspirations can be defined as “the task-specific assessment of the degree to which an 
individual hopes to perform” (Quagila and Cobb, 1996:130). Hoppe (1976) explains that 
aspirations shift and change with achievement, they are not static. In addition, the theory of 
Social Comparison, developed by Festinger, describes the significant impact of social 
situation on aspirational level (Festinger, 1942; 1954). Under this theory individuals will feel 
success relatively to their peers (Festinger, 1942), where “members of a group will strive to 
do well, but only proximally better to the other members of the group,” (Collier 1994 in 
Quagila and Cobb, 1996:130). This is an important factor. The question of who campesinos 
categorise as their “group” will, by this definition, determine aspiration levels and hence may 
influence their risk decisions. 
We can thus see that aspirations may evolve through time and with achievement, but will 
remain influenced by social context, as will be discussed in the next section. This study 
accepts that aspirations are also influenced by factors such as the impact of previous 
successes and failures and personality traits (Festinger, 1942). It also asserts that a strong 
aspect of socially constructed non-static influences such as the performance of others will 
also impact aspiration level. OP Theory could therefore also be expanded to incorporate that 
risk decisions are based on aspirations and that aspirations are not purely economic – 
avoiding loss, seeking gain – but involve a range of social parameters.  
Given that the Theory of Social Comparison suggests that individuals have aspirations based 
slightly above their group average then it is logical to assume that the inverse, they have 
aspirations to avoid losing relative social standing, is also true. This creates a decision 
paradox where there is aspiration to gain set against aspiration not to lose. Risk-decision 
could then be the solution to this conundrum.  
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As risk-decision theories state, decision-makers are nominally more risk averse against loss 
than towards gain. The result would thus be that aspirations of gain are more likely to be out-
competed by loss-averse decisions. Thus, risk-aversion is reinforced within the group by a 
cycle of risk-averse behaviour which moderates aspirations towards the average. This is not 
to say that there will be a perpetual cycle of risk-aversion, but that high-stake risks are more 
likely to be avoided in favour of moderate gains, hence stabilising the group situation. This 
combines two assumptions: 1) that individuals are within a closed group with few outside 
influences, which of course is rarely, if ever, the case, 2) that the perceived risks are equal 
amongst all members of the group, which is also unlikely. Taking these situations away it is 
likely that outside influences might alter aspiration levels. Unequal risks and unequal 
situations are likely to a driver of positive risk-decisions as group members aspire to keep to 
the social norm, but that this will be tempered once aspirations have been met. The proposal 
is thus is that risk-aversion and aspiration work together to promote achievement of marginal 
gains, while reducing exposure to loss, hence stabilising the aspirations within a group. It is 
important to add, however that the risk of catastrophic loss
20
 (Lipton, 1968) can be seen as 
the bottom line of risk aversion which must be avoided by all. This suggests that while 
Lipton’s OP Theory is largely enlightening and relevant to this study in its hypothesis that 
peasants are risk optimisers, it may also be realistic to view campesinos as risk stabilisers. 
Hypothesis 2a 
Evidence from data collected will support the Theory of the Optimising Peasant and 
will highlight areas in which individual campesinos are vulnerable to risk by 
demonstrating that   
 Campesinos engage in risk-averse behaviour due to perceptions of production 
and price uncertainties 
In this section examples from the primary data will be brought to illustrate the theory through 
perceptions of risk. 
Price Uncertainties 
OP Theory states that campesinos will engage in risk-averse behaviour predominantly due to 
productive and price uncertainties (Lipton, 1968).  
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 Catastrophic loss involves the loss of a peasant’s means of subsistence, for example – crops for household 
consumption 
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In the Valley Plain zone, campesinos have larger plots than those interviewed in other zones, 
at around 20ha each. They are also more engaged with the market, which exposes to greater 
price uncertainties. As OP Theory suggests, José-VS takes measures to limit risk by 
diversifying his crop. Diversification reduces José’s maximum potential income as mono-
culturing would provide better economies of scale
21
  hence decreasing costs by increasing 
land efficiency (Marx in Binswanger and Elgin, 1998:319). He states explicitly that he 
diversifies because he has two children to provide for. “[Diversifying]…makes it [income] 
more stable as we don’t know what the prices are going to be. The mill dictates the price of 
the wheat…What is expensive is reliance on pesticides,” (José-VS). That José was not 
explicitly asked about pesticides is also important. He equates price uncertainty and his 
response to it not only with crops prices but also with inputs. I believe both of these factors 
heightened José’s risk-adversity and his aversion to maximise production, due to the 
perceived risk of not having enough for his family, a subject he referred to twice.  
 The three interviewed campesinos of the plain each referred more frequently to risks of price 
uncertainty than the other interviewed campesinos, their responses being more similar to the 
interviewed farmers. They appear to have similar preconditions for their risk perceptions. 
First, they all have water rights granting access to irrigation canals, which cost little except 
for maintenance, this reduces production uncertainties. Second, their greater land area 
provides them with a greater possibility to grow crops for the market. This appears to expose 
them to different risks than campesinos in the cordillera and coastal zones, and similar risks 
to their neighbouring farmers. Though, unlike the farmers, José’s strategy was common 
amongst all campesinos, regardless of land area. José and the other valley campesinos appear 
to adopt regular farming techniques and the risks with them, but retain a number of traditional 
campesino techniques which limit their risk exposure such as auto-consumption and crop 
diversity, which they are all reluctant to give up. However, I believe their reluctance to stop 
diversifying is based nearly entirely in the need to minimise risk, not retain culture. As José-
AS said “If you guaranteed me a price for wheat, I would just produce that every year.” 
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 Economies of Scale refers to the decreasing cost of production per unit as production increases. 
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Risky Risk Minimisation 
Tomás-VS (19.5ha) applied a different strategy to José. Growing three market-oriented crops: 
wheat, maize and alfalfa
22
, in addition to crops for home consumption and a herd of 15 cows 
with 3 working horses. His is the only income for his family of four.  
Despite winning a PRODESAL project to subsidise 3ha of alfalfa the agency did not have the 
funds to complete the project. Tomás decided to fund the project himself with only their 
technical support. He does not say how much he invested in alfalfa to feed his animals 
through winter, though he says it is “substantial”. His decision to continue is risky by his own 
admission, though he has reduced the investment by half to 1.5ha. His decision was primarily 
due to price fluctuation of alfalfa (a concern shared by neighbour Nicolás-VS – who is also 
starting to grow alfalfa through PRODESAL, and has received the funding). In effect, though 
risky, it is more of a risk minimising decision, as is Nicolás’ decision to do the same, though 
Nicolás’ decision appears to be more risk averse due to his subsidy. These decisions 
highlighted to me that controlling risks were paramount for campesinos in the area. A high 
risk strategy such as Tomás infers an urgency to minimise risk, also backed up by José’s 
statement about monoculturing his land (above). Tomás rarely mentions his low production 
risks, concentrating on controlling price. 
This decision shows a risk-taking tendency beyond that expected by OP Theory. “The 
investment costs were high, he says, but PRODESAL thought it would be a worthwhile 
project so I decided to go for it,” (Tomás-VS). His investment is indicative of Diecidue and 
Van der Ven (2008) who state that the closer all possible outcomes are to the aspiration 
desired, the less risk-averse a person becomes (Diecidue and Van der Ven, 2008: 684). His 
aspirations are based in his desire for a new house for his family on the farm. This would 
require the farm to first be secure, but also productive.  
It is also perhaps indicative of Festinger (1942), as his aspiration to complete the project 
appears to have been influenced by his trusted associate in PRODESAL and, potentially by 
the fact that his neighbour was pursuing the same project, hence adding the influence of 
social comparison to the decision. Tomás-VS demonstrates risk-seeking behaviour in pursuit 
of an aspiration to reduce or stabilise his highest perceived risks (price-uncertainties) in the 
future. 
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 Alfalfa is a crop primarily grown to use as fodder (feed) for animals. 
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Similarly, Carlos-AS describes the highly risky decision to establish a strawberry crop three 
years ago. Frustrated with low wage labouring he aspired to get a loan from INDAP to plant 
and irrigate strawberries in the cordillera zone. After two rejections he now has 0.5ha of 
strawberries. When asked if he wants more (he has 1ha in total), he says no. He wants just 
one hectare (he produces his subsistence crops on the other half) but he wants to invest in 
some facilities to store the fruit – an aspiration for increased security – which will secure 
income for his family (Carlos-AS). His risk-taking behaviour to grow a new export crop, with 
volatile prices in a zone with unpredictable frost is not characteristic of OP Theory. When 
asked why he took the risk he states that he was a labourer on a large farm, but the pay was 
low and the conditions were bad, describing the poverty and the low self-esteem he and his 
family endured.  
He accepted one hectare of family land and attempted to secure “enough” income from 
strawberries (Carlos-AS). He explains that had nothing to lose, emphasising that “I never 
wake up and don’t want to work on my own land,” (Carlos-AS). Clearly his story is based in 
his aspiration to become de-proletarianised. It is clear that Carlos perceives his recent life as a 
success, but is less eager to discuss the debt to INDAP, which I believe is one of the driving 
factors of his risk-averse behaviour since he received the funding. Many of the campesinos 
briefly mentioned their debts, but were reluctant to discuss, this was also true for the farmers. 
Carlos shows a number of risk-averse tendencies. He engages with a simplified contract, after 
experimenting with two different complex ones, suggesting a form of compound-risk 
aversion described by Spears (2002). His aim, he says, is to achieve a stable, rather than 
increased income.  
This stability seeking aspiration was typical of all the interviewed campesinos, but not of the 
farmers, despite their equal propensity for debt. His story showcases that aspirations have 
great importance within decisions, perhaps more than OP Theory accounts for. He also 
showcases that those who perceive that they have little to lose have everything to gain 
through high-risk strategies, whereas the same person, with something to lose, will minimise 
losses and have economically reduced aspirations.  
Production Uncertainties 
With regard to production uncertainties, particularly climate, the most notable concerns were 
in the Cordillera region, where campesinos were concerned with water storage and the impact 
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of frost damage. This concern was also shared by José-VS, who was concerned with planting 
late enough to avoid frost, but early enough to avoid drought. His solution was to plant his 
crops two weeks apart, so one crop was more at risk of frost and one more of drought (José-
VS). This risk-aversion indeed optimised production, as he was more certain of getting at 
least 50% of his crop through this method, but could also achieve a full crop given the right 
conditions. It shows that diversification can also be within crops, not just between them. 
Campesinos in the study appeared to pursue a mixture of risk reducing strategies, especially 
in relation to price uncertainties where water is less scarce and land is larger and to 
production uncertainty where water is scarcer. The most prevalent risk-reduction strategy, 
auto-production, was never explicitly viewed as such, but all campesinos engaged in it. It was 
regarded more of a way of life, something that couldn’t be removed, something many 
campesinos actively enjoyed and were proud of, not because it was a risk-minimising 
measure. Some of the strategies involved high short-term risk with the prospect of reducing 
long term risk, an understandable phenomenon not outlined by OP Theory, but perhaps 
highlighting the perceived pressures of the market. 
Hypothesis 2b 
 Aspirations are based in meeting minimum requirements due to the risk of 
reduced standard of living from risky ventures. 
Many of the campesinos interviewed showed OP Theory supporting aspirations relating to 
risk minimisation and optimising production to meet minimum requirements. Luís-AS (11ha) 
is an interesting example as he employs both an optimising strategy at planting time - he has 
a moderately diverse selection of tradition crops which he claims he never changes. But he 
continues to optimise at harvest time, when most campesinos and farmers would be expected 
to attempt to gain as much from the harvest as possible, Luís has refused to harvest entire 
crops depending on the market price. His detailed descriptions of labour and market price 
fluctuations leave me with impression that he is his motives are not just financial, but 
efficiency seeking. While he is indebted, he also only has his wife on the holding
23
 and has 
other sources of income, allowing him to choose his decisions more freely. On-farm income, 
though important in his decisions, was not his only means of maintaining the household 
income. His optimisation of production appears to be based in his ability to withstand price 
shocks from the market through traditional means. 
                                                 
23
 His three children being adults living away from home 
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Optimising or Stabilising? 
The three campesinas in the Dry-Coastal zone Javiera-CS (4ha), Camila-CS (11ha) and 
Brenda-CS (3ha) all exhibit similarly low perceptions of risks, exemplified by this short 
statement “I don’t have any real risks” (Camilla-VS). They each have relatively small plots 
and access to ground water. Only Camilla grew any cereals (oats and maize) in addition to 
vegetables. Javiera and Brenda only grew vegetables. All sold their vegetables on adjacent 
market stalls established by PRODESAL. They also share a level of stability which they are 
not willing to compromise.  
Their shared primary aspirations were to maintain their situation, not to pursue further gains. 
When asked why, two of the three said that their aspirations were to keep their children in 
school; Brenda’s was to provide enough for her mother. Each also stated that this market stall 
had improved their income through better prices and sales. Both production (water) and price 
(market) uncertainties were low among all three. It appears that contrary to being risk averse 
to meeting aspirations, their aspirations had been met and they were averse to loss.  
They each appeared satisfied with their situation, both in the wording and the positive tone of 
their responses. In this regard these three women were demonstrating a low-risk, but highly 
satisfying optimisation strategy. Their crops, primarily tomatoes, cabbages and lettuce, were, 
by their own admission, vulnerable to weather, but it did not concern any of them 
significantly. When asked what future investments they might make they all mentioned either 
a greenhouse or a pump to improve access to ground water – further reducing production 
uncertainty. Each of them mentioned that they would only contemplate such an investment if 
PRODESAL would fund the majority. Their responses to these questions were notable 
because of their similarity and also because of their much more relaxed approach to water 
availability.  
However, none of them perceived that they were trading on a policy uncertainty. If 
PRODESAL’s funding was cut or re-allocated (as it had been with Tomás) they may have to 
find a new outlet for their produce. Camila was the only campesina whose household had 
another income. “The money that he [husband] makes by selling those things helps a lot for 
the family income,” (Camila-CS), making it clear that her income also made a substantial 
impact. This example highlighted to me that not all possible risks may be perceived by the 
decision-maker. It also brings the question of how they could diversify from their stalls and 
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perhaps also whether their lack of concern was partly due to the fact that they were also auto-
consumers. 
Though not conclusive, these three women express a level of social satisfaction linked to 
their aspirations. As Festinger (1942) suggests, aspirations are linked to social comparison. 
These women were concerned with meeting a minimum requirement, an aspect of OP Theory, 
but they were also satisfied by their aspirations to support family, produce quality and, 
perhaps meet socially constructed aspirations. I would suggest that their situation was of 
stabilisation and satisfaction rather than optimising production.  
In addition to the aspirations in the coastal zone campesinas, every other interview case with 
campesinos showed decisions were taken not to maximise gains but to reduce vulnerability to 
productive uncertainty and price uncertainty. Tomás-VS has an alfalfa investment, Carlos-AS 
aspires for a storage facility, Nicolás and José have new or proposed barns, all examples of 
risk-reducing strategies. In particular, Luís’ states “I always grow the same things, that way I 
know what I’m growing and if the price of one is low the price of another will make up for it” 
(Lewis-AS). All of these decisions are risk reducing strategies and all of them coincide with 
equal aspirations for stability rather than expansion, whether this was implicitly or explicitly 
expressed. 
However, if we view aspirations as Social comparison: that levels of attainment are 
influenced by social group attainment (Festinger 1942, 1954), it is possible to view 
campesino aspirations as perhaps more economically modest than even Lipton’s theoretical 
assumptions. It is also likely that campesinos, if they aspire to achieve slightly above their 
social average, will become satisfied with their position and wish to remain stable and at low 
risk of loss, rather than pursue further aims, as suggested in hypothesis one. This is 
showcased by Camila, Brenda and Javiera (CS). In the long term, this gradual process of 
advancement above the middle could lead to steady modernisation. This has been seen with 
all the campesinos interviewed, whether or not they have yet achieved this aim, they are 
planning (in the case of Carlos, Nicolás and Tomás) to secure their income. 
The risk decisions made by the interviewed campesinos appear to lead them generally 
towards the optimising strategies of the Theory of the Optimising Peasant. However, the 
examples show other tendencies which are not necessarily linked to avoiding reduced 
standard of living, particularly with aspirations to maintain satisfaction with a situation (the 
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campesinas in the coastal zone). This could be argued that it shows adversity to loss. 
However, the disregard for other potential risk factors suggests that unlike some of the other 
campesinos, Luís-AS for example, they are even less concerned with ensuring against loss 
than they are about further aspirations. For Camila-CS this could be due to the security of her 
husband’s income, but for the other two their only security was their auto-consumption. 
Conversely, campesinos in other areas were investing to secure future income in addition to 
optimisation strategising for current crops. 
Hypothesis 3 
Risk decisions within optimisation strategies are insufficient to make interpretations for 
or against the onset of depeasantisation in Chile’s market economy, as described by 
Murray (2006). 
To compete with risks campesinos have a range of choices between adapting their agriculture 
to the market, modernising (or not) and maximising the utility of family labour through 
highly incentivised and indivisible households. All options involve risk decisions, return 
different optimisation strategies and retain risks within themselves. Modernisers may risk 
debt, market orientation price uncertainties and contracts. Traditional actors in the market 
economy risk over-reliance on limited resources or a lack of capital to invest against 
productivity uncertainty. All risks come with positive utility. However, as will be outlined it 
is possible, indeed probable, to combine these factors, hence optimising results. 
Murray (2006) explains that peasants operating the market system are vulnerable to 
depesasantisation because of three interconnected issues as a result of being out-competed: 
land take-over, proletarianisation and exploitative contracts. He claims that INDAP’s 
attempts to modernise campesino small-holdings has been a leading cause of this through 
increasing exposure to the market (Murray, 2006). These attempts include forms of 
modernisation for campesinos including technology transfer programmes and credit access in 
addition to irrigation systems (INDAP, 2013; Murray, 2006), as evidenced by Carlos-CS. 
The evidence from the data suggests that campesinos are able to request a range of help from 
PRODESAL to improve their farm, though it is not always delivered. PRODESAL provides 
support with developing project proposals, but campesinos are able to propose any project 
they wish. Of the interviewed campesinos who had received assistance from INDAP or 
PRODESAL only one, Carlos-AS, had opted for a true market-oriented modernisation. The 
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others had received more security oriented assistance such as help with a barn, described 
below, or access to the local market via a stall, as in the coastal region. Hence, Murray’s 
summary may not be entirely accurate and Kay’s (2002) call for a site-specific neo-
structuralist development programme appears to be underway. 
Modernisation 
 There is then a question of what modernisation entails and what impact it will bring to 
campesinos. Much of the debate surrounding modernisation involves economic principles 
such as scale economies, whereby the unit cost of production falls relative to the additional 
input given. This is often attributed to modernisation through mechanisation, which is more 
difficult on smaller lands due to the relative cost of machinery to the size of the farm 
(Binswanger and Elgin, 1998). Like Chayanov and others, Binswanger and Elgin (1998:319-
321) argue that modernisation and particularly mechanisation does not necessarily mean the 
end of small-scale agriculture. They point to the allocation of rented machinery to reduce the 
cost. In the study area all producers rented machinery such as tractors, including the largest 
scale farmers such as Mario-VL and Roberto-VL. This equal reliance on rented equipment 
reduces the perceived benefit of scale-economies on large farms. Binswanger and Elgin 
(1998: 320) state that machine rental markets reduce the impact of large-farm scale 
economies. This decreases the impact on campesino agriculture of scale economies. 
The basic premise of Shultz (1964), on which Lipton’s OP Theory is also built is that 
campesinos lack the capital to improve their agricultural practices and that they could indeed 
be competitive in the capitalist market (as Chayanov 1966 also suggests) if they had access to 
investment. Bonnen also argues that technological advancement alone is not sufficient for 
agricultural development, improvements in human capital are also needed to utilise these 
tools (Bonnen 1987: 267). This signifies that if campesinos are to utilise new technologies 
properly they must be capable of utilising them effectively, otherwise modernisations will 
become ineffective hence exacerbating the struggle to compete. I would argue the Shultzian 
angle that campesinos, being skilled and understanding the needs of their land, have a good 
understanding of which improvements make sense in their situation. This is the first stage in 
human capital development, understanding the benefits of a farm modernisation. The next 
stage is to understand how to effectively utilise any improvement. If campesinos can draw 
capital to invest in appropriate modernisations and utilise them effectively then there is strong 
case that this form of optimisations may be sufficient to compete. 
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In the study many campesinos had received subsidies for investment from PRODESAL. This 
was as a result of submitting potential farm improvement projects to the organisation. Many 
campesinos also mentioned that the advice of PRODESAL extension workers had helped 
them make decisions for improvements. What is most interesting though is that few of their 
projects had been of the market-oriented style described by Murray (2006). Instead, these 
investments, a barn (José-CS), alfalfa crops (Nicolás-VS) and a well (Tomás), all served to 
reduce either production or price uncertainties in the market. 
In effect, these campesinos are utilising modernisations, though not necessarily technology to 
protect their agriculture, rather than improve their market position. This demonstration shows 
not only that campesinos have astute optimisation and stabilisation strategies when given 
access to credit and extension, but also that they can and do modernise. Hence they are able 
to reduce market impacts and production uncertainties which could directly and indirectly 
increase the risks of the capitalist system. 
 
Land Re-concentration? 
Murray suggests that Chilean campesinos are at risk of land take-over through both 
exploitative purchases and, more subtly, through contracts with large-scale farms and 
agribusinesses which in effect proletarianise campesinos through non-wage employment 
(Murray 2006). In contrast, Hayami (1996) emphasises the importance of small-farms to 
improve the managerial efficiency of production. Empirical evidence form the Marxist 
agricultural revolutions in Russia showed that large-scale, hired-labour farms were less 
productive than their small-scale family counterparts and this was because hired labour 
lacked both incentive and knowledge to fine-tune their production (Bernstein 2009, 
Chayanov 1966, Hayami 1996). In the case of Chilean agriculture the situation appears to be 
that agribusiness is attempting to utilise the managerial skills of campesinos to produce crops 
for them, which Murray labels as a new form of proletarianisation. This is a technique 
outlined by Hayami (1996) and gives reference to Binswanger and Elgin’s (1998) principles 
of managerial abilities being as important as modernisation. Murray’s concerns depend on the 
type of contract employed and the relative outcome of the venture to the campesino. Provided 
the campesino has reasonable possibility to withdraw from the contract or adapt it (i.e. it is 
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not a permanent contract) and the returns are reasonable for the investment made, then it 
would be difficult to categorise it as proletarianisation.  
Some of the campesinos had experienced this type of contract. José-VS and Tomás-VS had 
both engaged in disadvantageous contracts in the past with large agribusinesses and had 
stopped the contracts due to the restrictions placed upon them. A similar situation occurred 
with Carlos-AS the strawberry grower. These contracts had not enforced a new level of 
proletarianisation on the growers as they were free to not renew the contract the following 
year, their reluctance to continue with contracts also showed a thread of desire to be 
independent, especially during Carlos-AS’ interview. In reality, perhaps the hardest hit by 
contracts of all those interviewed was Andres-VM, a medium-scale farmer in the valley who 
had 60ha under traditional crops (maize, wheat, oats) and high value berries including 
blueberries and raspberries). His responses were perhaps the most revealing:  
“I have contracts for the fruit, but I don’t know how much I will get until I have sold 
the fruit. I sell it to the company then when it has been processed they tell me how 
much I will get.” (Andres-VM) 
It is worthy of note that Andres perceives less ability to reject disadvantageous contracts 
than any of the interviewed campesinos involved in similar business. Campesinos appear to 
be buoyed by their relatively diverse crops and auto-consuming practices which restrict the 
influence of price uncertainty. It is also worthwhile discussing here the methods employed 
by farmers to limit agribusiness power. Mario-VL ensures he always has three low-
minimum amount, no-fixed-price contracts for his produce. “I sell the largest share to the 
company offering the best price, and give the other two a small share to ensure the contract 
for the next year.” (Mario-VL). In another case a dairy and grain farmer stated her 
belligerence towards a large brewing company: 
“… [T]hey called me from reception [at the brewery], saying that my barley was high 
in protein and they said they would take it, but at a lower price... I told the truck 
drivers to come back. I didn’t give them anything. I gave it to the cows… I think that 
was the first time something like that happened to them,” (Maria-VL). 
 It is not just campesinos who run risks with the capitalist system. Contrary to Murray’s 
suggestion, it appears that the campesinos interviewed do have effective strategies, in the 
same way as large-scale farmers, for dealing with agribusiness. However, the example of 
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Andres-VM showcases Murray’s concerns for the future. If campesinos should become too 
market reliant they may face the concerns of Andres-VM. 
In the above examples we can see the importance of managing modernisations and also of 
risk-managing interaction with the market as methods of campesinos preventing the 
proletarianisation outlined by Murray, but it doesn’t necessarily imply that all campesinos are 
avidly retaining their culture. Rather it appears that many traditional cultures of campesinos 
are taken as a natural way of life, especially auto-consumption, which many do not see as part 
of the farm, but an aspect of life they enjoy and take pride in as Brenda-CS states “I enjoy 
producing food for my family.” Aspects of life such as this are not seen as commodities to 
trade away or keep, or as strategies of risk reduction. 
The illustration of a continuum (Murray 2006) allows us to place the situation of each 
campesino in a middle ground, where peasant agriculture may be adapting, rather than 
stagnating or imploding, to fit into a market economy. A view supported by research by 
Echeverría et al. (2009), Challies and Murray (2011) and Hayami (1996). 
Through an analysis of various hypothetical and empirical analyses it has been shown that 
risks involving modernisation among campesinos does not necessarily place them at more 
risk of proletarianisation, neither does it necessarily follow that modernisations leading to a 
more capitalist approach is a precursor to depeasantisation. OP theory states that campesinos 
can compete with large-scale producers through effective optimising strategies which may 
include modernising, corresponding to Shultz (1964) and Hayami (1996). This pragmatic 
modernisation mixed with traditional practices has been noted in Ecuador with indigenous 
peoples and has helped conserve a traditional way of life (Bebbington, 1993:275).  
Modernisations are common among the campesinos interviewed with the aspiration to 
preserve their way of life, living on and from the land. Provided the risks are modest, most 
campesinos interviewed had or were planning to adopt stability-increasing technologies. 
Most enlightening is that the campesinos interviewed viewed the export market as a risky 
venture and if they are involved they have put in place risk-reducing strategies to minimise 
the impact.  
OP theory requires a much greater depth of understanding of how risk-decisions are made, 
including aspirations and social (as well as geographical) situations. In addition, the 
propensity of campesinos to take decisions based on these factors influences their future but 
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not in the linear fashion that the continuum stipulates. Rather decisions are made with the 
intention to maintain, change, - or even revert - production practices. To place these into 
context a new model is proposed, based on the theories above and the primary data collected. 
It accounts for the impact a decision may have on the future trajectory of a campesino 
household, accounting for the fact that depeasantisation is not necessarily negative, but 
depends on the aspirations and hence the decisions of the decision-makers. 
Campesino Optimum Modernisation Model  
It is proposed that modernisation and the market are neutrally linked to the Peasant Economy 
Continuum proposed by Murray (2006). They are engines of change, but may be utilised to 
retain campesino culture through greater security or, equally, could lead to lost cultural norms 
through untying links to the land, promoting casual labour or urban migration. Provided there 
is adequate support for campesinos, with incentives to invest and overcome risk-averse 
behaviour, the future of campesinos will lie in their choices and aspirations and the success of 
any modernisations they choose to make. 
An attempt has been made to plot these trends as a theoretical graph, to aid understanding.  
  
   Modernisation 
 
    
Decampesinistas Campesinistas 
 
  
 
    Tradition  
 
In this diagram it is possible for farmers to engage in decisions which lead to increments of 
all possible outcomes on the continuum through potential adaptive strategies involving 
modernisation of technology, practice, human capital, or any other modernisation tool, and 
Cultural 
Security 
Traditionalism Proletarianisation 
Farmerisation 
Figure 2: Proposed Optimum Modernisation Model 
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also through retention of traditional methods. As it is continuous, rather than discreet or 
binary, it can take account of the complexity of decisions and outcomes of campesino such as 
decisions to plant both export and auto-consumption crops. 
Definitions  
These terms are generalisation of the quadrant, not fixed definitions. The closer campesinos 
placed to the axes may have increasingly overlapping similarities with campesinos in 
adjacent quadrants.  
1) Farmerisation: Campesinos modernise and become more market oriented. This 
is not necessarily a full loss of culture, but an adaptation. The position within the 
quadrant is determined by the level of modernisation, the level of market 
involvement and level of retention of cultural ties. Campesinos may seek greater 
income but risk market uncertainty, leading to income insecurity. 
2) Cultural Security: A campesinos may modernise to secure income and security 
rather than promote profit, adapting their agriculture to secure cultural traditions 
important to them. Campesinos may seek security but risk not having the capital 
to ensure it. 
3) Proletarianisation: A campesino decides to maintain the land or produce for 
market without modernising, may sell or lease some or all of the land or utilise 
increased off-farm employment (Kay, 1997:21). Campesinos may seek cost 
effective market involvement, but risk exploitation. 
4) Traditionalism: Continuation of traditional producing and preservation 
traditional norms with minimal investment in new technology. Campesinos may 
seek a traditional life, without market price uncertainties, but risk increased 
production uncertainty. 
Of course, a Campesino does not necessarily start in the middle and make a decision of one 
of the four quadrants. Rather, campesinos take decisions through time which lead their 
situation either decisively or indecisively, and in varying degrees, towards an area of the 
graph. It is possible to move within the model, positions are not fixed, nor pre-determined, 
with positions being determined by outcome rather than intention. A campesino may, for 
example, choose a variety of risk-minimising, market protection strategies which enables 
him/her to invest in a crop purely for the market. This would place them high on the 
modernisation scale, but slightly right of centre on the campesinista scale. The success of the 
market crop would cause a shift towards the left, horizontally towards farmerisation. 
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The model above indicates that campesinos may aspire to place themselves at any position 
within its boundaries, taking aspects of market economy with traditional practices secured 
through technology, as Carlos-AS demonstrates. His neighbour Jorge-AS, would demonstrate 
more capitalist leaning tendencies, whereby he has expanded his land and engages with the 
market but chooses to remain only a minor raspberry producer. Had his raspberries been 
more successful he may have opted to be further integrated into the market. Thus this is a 
model of adaptation, framed by the Theory of the Optimising Peasant. It demonstrates that 
modernisation is not a prerequisite of proletarianisation, but that excessive risky ventures 
towards “farmerisation” could lead there.  It suggests that measures to secure income through 
modernisation and limited market interaction cause a shift directly away from potential 
proletarianisation, but of course this situation relies on either access to credit, either through 
loans, which are market-oriented, or neo-structuralist subsidies such as PRODESAL. It also 
argues that situations are not fixed as uncertainty of agriculture persists.  
Aspirations in the Model 
Consider the level of aspiration a campesino may have for a particular project. According to 
Festinger (1942; 1954) and Quagila and Cobb (1996) campesinos’ decisions to modernise 
will gravitate towards a slightly higher achievement than their social average. Under this 
situation campesinos are likely to move slowly into modernisation due to their aspirations 
and their risk-averse decisions based on optimising, rather than maximising, production and 
stability. It is thus likely that campesinos will move first towards modernisations securing 
income and then towards increasing market interaction. With each increment of market 
involvement it is likely campesinos, as risk optimisers will seek to secure their position, as 
shown by Carlos-CS’ desire to improve storage facilities. However, the ability to modernise 
depends on access to credit, which may require increased market interaction. 
The level of market interaction may also be influenced by social factors as in Festinger (1942, 
1954) and by location. Campesinos in the valley plain have much better access to markets 
and irrigation than those in sparsely populated cordillera and the dry-coastal regions, for 
example. Examples of this manoeuvre are apparent in the campesinos interviewed, with 
Brenda, Camila and Javiera (CS), Nicolás and Tomás moving towards securing their income 
in line with their contemporaries within the options accessible in their region.  
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An Example of Mixed Farmerisation 
Jorge-AM is a traditional farmer from the Andes Cordillera. His family have a campesino 
heritage, yet his farm is now 60ha in size. By the definitions laid out in this paper he is not a 
campesino but a medium-sized farmer. This brings a paradox to the question of campesino 
agriculture, whether or not it should be determined by scale or culture. Talking to Jorge I was 
able to establish that he was not wealthy and suffered from the same risks as the other 
campesinos and farmers interviewed in his village, yet he demonstrated more advanced levels 
of farmerisation than his contemporaries. Jorge’s case is interesting because, he has 
accumulated land and now employs ten labourers to pick his raspberries, though he has 
accumulated risks, too. He believes his investment in raspberries was a mistake owing to the 
labour cost rises and unstable prices. In many regards Jorge has become “farmerised”, yet has 
retained many aspects of his ties to the land, hoping his family will continue to farm the land 
in the future and that one of his main aspirations was to stop the forestry companies from 
taking his land. 
 
Conclusions 
Much of the complexity of decision making that has been highlighted by the participants in 
this research can be explained using Lipton’s Theory of the Optimising Peasant. However, 
there is a need to account for aspirations as part of decisions under risk. These aspirations are 
likely to be based on the household achieving above the mean social attainment level, rather 
than optimising productivity values. Though the theories of risks and optimisation support 
many of the decisions made by campesinos in the data, campesinos suggested a near-
unanimous aspiration to achieve stability rather than optimise productivity, which appeared to 
be based in their aspirations to reduce perceived risks.   
Meeting aspirations for stability accounts for a great deal of satisfaction among interviewed 
campesinos to the extent that it appeared to lower further economic aspirations. I propose that 
campesinos are optimisers of stability, rather than optimisers of production. 
In addition, the research finds that while either Murray’s (2006) or Chayanov’s (1966 and in 
Millar, 1970) dichotomous decampesinistas and campesinistas views are possible outcomes 
of capitalist influences on campesino agriculture, they are unlikely (as Murray (2006) also 
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suggests). Campesinos can, do and will adapt through optimisation of various modernisation 
strategies in pursuit of their own aspirations. The likely situation is thus that campesinos will 
persist into the future through a variety of risk-minimisation strategies which support first 
stability seeking, then moderate market interaction. PRODESAL, as a neo-structuralist 
intervention, is enabling many of the interviewed campesinos to engage in their own 
aspirations for modernisation. Due to risk-aversion tendencies these modernisations appear to 
refute, rather than advance the depeasantisation patterns outlined by Murray (2006), both 
theoretically and through examples from the literature. In addition, neo-structuralist 
intervention appears to be supporting Chilean campesinos to achieve their own aspirations 
through access modernisation and is warmly welcomed by campesinos interviewed, though it 
is not comprehensive. 
This research finds that the stability seeking caution of campesino optimisation strategies is 
an important factor in the survival of campesinos as a distinct cultural group in Chilean 
Agriculture. Of course, all risks cannot be eliminated, and agriculture will retain some risk 
for all actors in the system. Perhaps this is summed up best by Carlos-AS when I asked him 
about his risk factors. “In the end” he said “you just have to do it and hope for the best”.  
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Appendix 1 
Interview Questions 
Questions are highlighted in bold are key questions which should be covered in the interview 
at some stage. Non-bold questions may be of some use to prompt interviewees. 
 
What crops do you grow/livestock do you rear? Have you always grown these 
crops/livestock?    
How much contact do you have with local farmers who grow the same crops? 
How much land do you farm? Is it owned or is it rented? 
How do you water your crops? Do you have water rights? How many? Is it enough? 
Where do you sell your produce? How did you organise this? How stable is the price?  
Formal education, family, age.  
Questions about aspirations 
Aspirations are about the future 
 What are you biggest expenditures on the farm? 
 What are your most important expenditures? Which expenditures need 
protecting the most?  
 How do you prioritise expenditure from your income? What is the order of 
priority? (use this to inform the following questions?) 
 What do you consider your greatest aspiration to be?  
 As a farmer what motivates you? 
 
 This year, what is your primary goal for your income? 
 Where do you see your farm in 5years? What changes do you hope to make? Why? 
 And in 10-20 years? (change depending on age of the farmer) 
 What do you hope to achieve with this farm? 
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Farm Questions – climate etc. 
 How do you market your produce? 
 How do you hire labour for harvest time?  
 How do you water your fields? 
  
 How much does climate impact your production? 
 Do you notice any changes between years in climate, labour or water? 
 
Questions about risks 
 Thinking about your farm, how would you define a risk? 
 What are your biggest risks with growing xxxx?   
 In the long term what challenges do you face on your farm? 
 
 How do you plan to combat these challenges?  
 Except for the farm, what other issues you face? Day-to-day, and for the future. 
Investments 
 How do you think a farm cost is different from a farm investment? 
 What is the biggest investment you have employed in your farm? 
 What investments have you made to the farm over the past 5 years? 
 (What do they achieve?) 
 (How did you fund the investment?) 
 How have your investments changed your farm? 
 
 How has the farm changed since you were young/first started working at the farm? 
 How has farming in general in Chile changed in the same period? 
 Have you ever received help from government agencies to make investments? 
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Questions of how these relate 
 How do you well do you think your investments match your aspirations? 
 What investments would you like to make that would help you reach these goals? 
 What do you need to make those investments? 
 
Questions of success 
 How do you measure success? 
 Do you consider yourself a success now?  
 (When do you think you will? What do you have to achieve?) 
 How do you think success differs from happiness? 
 (Would you generally consider yourself a happy person? 
 Thinking as a farmer and also as a person (aside from being a farmer). 
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Appendix 2 
Themes 
The following is a tabled representation of the focal research themes (table 1) and their value 
to understanding the known factors which influence decisions among campesinos. 
Table 1: Focal Research Themes 
Theme Sub-areas Reason for inclusion Explanatory Value 
Aspirations 
success and 
motivation 
Personal 
Farm-related 
Satisfaction 
Happiness 
Aspirations for success 
indicate the types of risks 
likely to be taken. Risk 
aversion or profit maximising 
Motivation for risk 
decisions, satisfaction 
with life and influencing 
factors. 
Risk 
perceptions 
Major risks 
on the farm 
 
Past 
experience 
Perceptions of major risks for 
production will influence 
decisions. Past experiences, 
concerns or worries may 
influence perceptions 
Perceptions of risk may 
not be related to actual 
risks. They may be 
distorted based on 
experience (risk-
aversion) 
  
Table 2: Themes of understanding 
Theme Sub-areas Reason for inclusion Explanatory Value 
Climatic 
issues 
Precipitation 
Frost 
Major risk factors in 
agriculture. Decisions are 
often based around this issue 
according to theory. 
What the farm-specific 
issues are perceived to be 
and hence one aspect of why 
which decisions are made 
Irrigation Water access 
Methods 
Investments 
Lack of year-round rainfall 
makes access to water in dry-
season vital. Sources of this 
water are important due to the 
reliability of the source and 
the distribution of shared 
resources 
The extent to which farms 
are protected from drought, 
how water is supplied and 
the efficiency and cost of 
the system. 
Crops and Crop type Crops are grown based upon What is grown determines 
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land use Previous crop 
types 
Reasons for 
changes/ 
choices 
likely market value, tradition, 
knowledge of the crop and its 
ability to grow in the 
landscape Crop choice is a 
risk decision. Other factors 
may also play a role such as  
what the risks will be as 
well as cultural and 
geographic ties. 
markets Methods of: 
-selling  
-Labour   
acquisition 
Knowledge 
of markets 
Farm inputs 
Market access and market 
prices determine the price a 
farmers receives for their 
crops.  However, the market 
price for farm inputs 
(fertilisers etc.), labour and 
seeds are also important risk 
factors.  
Understanding how farmers 
view the markets and how 
they interact with them (or 
not) helps explain their 
impact and their importance. 
Government interventions 
are often market oriented, 
which may not be beneficial 
 
 
